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ANTHROPOLOGY AND AD\JOCACY:
OFF OF THE FENCE AND INTO THE FORAY
Lindsey Huculiak
Defining moral obligations in any
discipline is a complex task. Few fields,
like psychology, have 'hard and
steadfast' rules concerning ethical
understanding. Other professionals, like
medical practitioners have more widely
acknowledged moral obligations to their
patients. In some arenas, like business,
ethical practices can be sporadic and
erratic, and subject to a variety of
interpretations. Even the legal system,
whose very existence rests upon a search
for definition and the enforcement of
morality contains many contradictions in
defining moral and immoral acts. The
common law system for example, is
based not upon a cohesive pattern of
actions, but upon exemplars of
behaviour, whose moral siding is
regularly subject to intense scrutiny,
often resulting in a revision of moral
coding. Above all, one thing is certain:
there is no underlying universally held
ideology of what constitutes good and
bad.
Often anthropologists are called
upon to describe their professional
versions of events, societies, or practices
to interested organizations or individuals.
The questions involved in deciding for
whom to advocate, on what grounds, and
with which information, are closely tied
to the search for anthropological
morality. Anthropology can play a key
role in mediating between or in testifying
for or against parties, yet there are no
formal conventions for classifying
certain materials, even if the
anthropologist may view those materials
as privileged and potentially damaging.
The point at which the anthropologist can
divulge information without breaking
moral obligations is unclear, since no
clear ethical code exists for
anthropology.
Given such an unstable basis for
determining the ethical obligations of
any discipline, is there hope that
anthropology can carve out its own sense
of morality? The American
Psychological Association has a
document outlining rules of conduct for
its psychologists. For anthropologists,
however, there are pressures unrealized
by psychologists. For example, the
complex relationships between
individuals, cultures, nations, and states
all play largely in determining the actions
of the anthropologist. The possible large-
scale effects of anthropological
interventions are a calculating factor in
determining for whom and for what to
advocate. Numerous problems face the
Anthropologist who is trying to decide
for whom, how, and when to advocate.
Then as Hastrup and Elasass posit, why
not abstain from advocation, since
advocacy and anthropology have such
irreconcilable differences (1990:301)?
As enticing as it may be to refrain
from intervention, is it even a viable
possibility? What previously separated
anthropologists from activists was their
unwillingness to enter into the foray, due
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to a moral and professional obligation to
remain participant observers. As the
amount of evidence of anthropologists
intervening in societies increases,
(Hastrup and Elsass 1990), it appears that
the role of the anthropologist is evolving
into that of the "observant participant"
(Turner 1991:309).
It may be that anthropologists
owe their interaction to the societies they
study. Anthropology traditionally sends
people to distant lands to study rural
societies. These communities are
expected to welcome the new intruder, to
accept his or her daily presence and
continual prodding without asking
anything in return. If anthropologists
make a living by imposing themselves
upon other societies, should they not be
expected to use some of their knowledge
as a means of helping those societies?
Their expertise is in helping to preserve
tradition, and by virtue of this, would be
the last ones to attempt to replace
tradition with modem capitalist notions
of development.
Perhaps the world is ready for
anthropology to give volume to the
voices of the people it studies. Many
anthropologists have opined for a 'useful
anthropology' that could provide
information that would in some way be
useful to the world outside academia
(Godelier 1994; Barth 1994). To be
useful it must be truthful and honest;
perhaps these are the only two tenets that
can be agreed upon in anthropology at
this time. In order to produce such
credible work, anthropology has no
choice but to attempt the codification of
moral obligations to be practiced by its
members. By writing a formal code of
ethics and enforcing statements of
professional responsibility,
anthropologists can guarantee the quality
of their work to communities of study,
and help decode it for the general public.
Roy D' Andrade emphasizes that
linguistic confounding must be
considered the root of the problem
behind morality (1995:399).
Semantically, a moral action can be
defined as an act in favour of promoting
or upholding notions of goodness. The
lines drawn for such 'moral goodness'
are what dissect morality into its
unequal, jumbled parts. Of great
importance to anthropologists is
determining for whom moral obligations
are enacted (Tonkinson 1997; Hastrup
and Elsass 1990). Ethnicity, by its very
nature defines the differences between
groups, and may even put the ideologies
of two groups in opposition. The solid
ground on which to plant the moral flag
is determined by whose camp one visits.
The lack of solidarity of a single ethnic
group on a single topic has often caused
anthropologists a nightmare in ethical
rendering (Tonkin son 1997; Hastrup and
Elsass 1990).
Even those issues that appear to
be clear cut can be redefined to create a
convoluted representation of reality.
Take ethnocentrism for example. To
have pride in one's ethnicity is hardly a
crime, and is promoted worldwide; yet
some would argue that ethnocentrism
could be misrepresented as a form of
racism (Geertz 1994). The preservation
of culture may even be seen by some as a
means of survival (Tonkinson 1997:8).
The division between pride and
prejudice, however, is thin, and it is
anthropology that must deal with the
disentaglement between the two. The
moral necessity of promoting culture
may have often been enacted to the
detriment of another culture, and as
categories of 'moral' and 'immoral' are
hardly ever mutually exclusive, a degree
of interpretation is necessary.
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Interpretation presents a problem
in its own right. Anthropologists have
come to realize that they must situate
themselves in the course of their
ethnographies (Nader 1994). The
ethnographer's very presence in the
community has ramifications that cannot
be ignored (Hastrup and Elsass 1990).
Turner (1991) notes that the media
attention brought to distant communities
not only strengthens the communities'
sense of pride in culture, but may
actually present a forum for culture to be
showcased as a means of meeting social
and cultural ends. One must therefore
acknowledge that the society of study has
been irreversibly altered by the intrusion
of anthropology.
Hastrup and Elsass describe their
presence in the Arhuaco community as
having the power to "split Arhuaco
society further. Advocacy was difficult
under these circumstances, and
anthropological advocacy seemed
impossible" (1990:305). Life in that
village did not go on as if one were a 'fly
on the wall' . The very method of
information collection requires the
interaction of anthropologist and subject
of study. The relationship between
anthropologist and community cannot be
ignored as there are real consequences
for both sides. The interpreted version of
any society's culture will be different
according to who tells the story: the
citizens of that culture, or the
anthropologist that observes it. No single
viewpoint is sufficient nor accurate
enough to convey an understanding of
any society. Thus any single event may
be interpreted in many ways.
The rendering of any
interpretation can offer more, or less,
support for the ideological value placed
on a given culture. The accountability
that anthropologists cultivate is,
therefore, not only to their employing
agenCIes, but to the subjects and
audiences of their work as well. To
provide an accurate representation of a
society is one of the greatest
responsibilities the anthropologist has; it
is also possibly the hardest feat to
accomplish.
Whereas one might think it not so
difficult to choose the more ethical side
of an argument thus rendering a moral
code moot, Godelier (1994) illustrates
how one person's good may be seen as
another person's evil. His article defines
the act of witnessing, which is one of the
latest roles some anthropologists have
taken on. The job of being an expert
witness should be well suited to the
anthropologist: given his or her training
in detailed note taking and observation
and the immersion into the lifestyle of
the studied society. The anthropologist
may be the best individual outside of the
native community to describe the given
culture. As anthropological tenants
advise, anthropology should interpret the
life of the native for those outside of the
native society, so as to bridge any
cultural barriers in understanding.
Godelier describes a case in
which he testifies for a defendant of
Baruya culture who is charged with
murdering his wife. By citing that
cultural law gave the defendant the right
to mercilessly hack his wife to pieces in a
field, Godelier advocated on the side of
culture, rather than for individual
freedom to life (Godelier 1994:98).
Godelier marks his conviction of his
moral standpoint by challenging other
anthropologists to consider their actions
in the same situation. He states that his
actions were guided by ethics and
science, and he declares that other
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anthropologists "would not necessarily
have shared my scruples about helping to
propagate the 'true' faith" (1994:98).
Whether Godelier's true faith is the
Baruya culture, anthropology, or law, is
unclear. What evident, however, is the
controversial nature of Godelier's
decisions, which to him seem natural, but
to many may seem immoral. As seen in
the Godelier case, the anthropologist
must decide for himself or herself when
and where intervention is necessary, and
which side to support.
The Godelier case illustrates a
particular problem posed to
anthropologists: if local courts begin
using anthropological testimony of
cultural norms in deciding the fate of
murderers, the door is open to possible
misuse by anthropologists or non-
anthropologists alike. One should take
careful consideration before equating a
cultural norm with legal rights. While
some cultures accept that some forms of
murder are unavoidable and should go
unpunished (like self-defense), others
condone murder as a punishment for
criminals (like death sentencing). It is
unlikely that open murder as a method of
legal enforcement at the hand of citizens
is supported by many cultures. When
anthropologists support the view that
events such as murder or torture are
culturally constructed and thus justified,
they place unnecessary power in the
hands of individuals outside legal
systems (see Godelier 1994). Should the
'culture defense' become popular,
suspects could plead memberships to
cultures from which they are really not
affiliated, or in which they are not
located during the crime.
It is appropriate that individuals,
such as anthropologists, who are privy to
information that others are not, should be
able to provide expert testimony in areas
of their expertise. Yet one can see the
difficulty in advocating on behalf of an
individual in sensitive cases. This should
prove especially difficult for
anthropologists, who are generally taught
not to judge others, but rather to accept,
observe, and record. In dealing with
foreign cultures the best anthropologists
are those who are willing to be open
minded about events that may seem
alien. Ultimately, knowledge and
experience must be tempered with
common sense and morality.
Anthropological testimony should no
doubt be a helpful tool in the legal
system, but it is only a piece in the larger
puzzle of understanding circumstance,
context, and motive.
In the vein of creating a 'useful'
version of anthropological research, one
must examine how the world that is
unacquainted with anthropology can be
informed by it. The interaction between
anthropology and public opinion has
often been strained. Anthropologists may
be viewed with suspicion by natives,
regarded with mistrust by officials, and
can be subject to the continual criticism
of members of their own discipline.
Finding a prominent place within
anthropology is no doubt difficult, let
alone one that is easily applicable to
popular problems. Perhaps another
example of anthropology at trial will
illustrate a contrast between the ways in
which anthropology and the general
public view the world.
A recent anthropological blunder
into the legal system is described by
Robert Paine's article "In Chief Justice
McEachern's Shoes: Anthropology's
Ineffectiveness in Court" (1996). Paine
outlines the inability of the discipline to
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support the actions of individuals outside
of the academic world. The major
problem in this court case was the
anthropologists' inability to present
evidence to the court that could be
deemed factual. The case involved a land
claim of the Giksan Wet'suwet'en people
of British Colombia. They recounted
stories of their history, as a basis for their
right to claim particular land, and hired
anthropologists to provide testimony that
would aid in the translation of their
culture to the general Canadian public.
Since modern Western society places an
emphasis on written records as proof of
historical events, any culture that relies
upon oral tradition for such information
faces a losing battle. In this case,
anthropologists failed to equate oral
tradition with written tradition, and were
unable to convince the judge to see life
from the Natives' perspective.
The prosecution were able to use
the anthropologists' close ties with the
Giksan Wet' suwet' en people to
demonstrate that rather than being expert
witnesses, they were in fact hostile ones.
The reason for this judgment was that the
anthropologists would be inclined to
present testimony that was biased in
favour of the Natives. The treatment that
the anthropologists received while on the
stand was unexpected, because they had
no real understanding of the meaning of
expert witness as it pertained to the
Canadian legal system, and may have
altered their abilities to provide
important information.
Another other flaw of the
anthropologists in this case was their
inability to come to one concrete
conclusion on which a ruling could be
based. Since anthropologists openly
advocate that there are more than one
acceptable interpretation of the facts,
how is any jury to find evidence in their
testimonies (paine 1996:61)? Paine
specifically characterizes the chief aim of
anthropologists in this case to " on the
one hand, de-exoticize the construction,
and on the other, avoid presenting it as
factually true ... but as a truth of cultural
distinction" (1996:62). To make an
individual understand something
complex, Paine suggests that culture
must be made familiar, and he notes the
anthropologists' abysmal failure at this
task during the course of the trial, where
"the exotic, indeed the arcane, was left
uninterpreted, the philosophically
complex rendered bizarre" (1996:62).
Proving a point to the public is clearly a
different task than supporting an
argument in an anthropological text.
The moral obligation of the
anthropologist in such a case wavers
between packaging information in a
manner which is clearly understandable
to the layperson and therefore requiring
alteration of the facts, or continuing to
produce ethnographies that are deemed
biased by some legal systems, and
therefore useless to the causes of the
societies one studies. Thus should an
anthropologist dilute the facts and insist
upon a single interpretation for the sake
of the law? The value placed upon
testimony is that it reflects a single,
honest interpretation - a view that
suggests that other interpretations are
somehow falsified.
An example of this dilemma is
the meager difference between dream
and reality in aboriginal culture, in
contrast to modern white populations in
which the two are very distinct (paine
1996:61). To reconcile these polarities,
the anthropologist must translate the
differences into similarities. Such a
challenge could possibly result in the
rendering of untruthful facts in the aim of
meeting an honest goal. The
anthropologist must sometimes debate
between relaying honesty through the
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means or in reaching it at the end. Given
that an anthropologist has volunteered to
aid in providing expert witness in a trial,
it becomes difficult to produce testimony
that is applicable and valid, with which a
group could reach a reasonable
consensus.
Anthropology's failure to provide
a background for understanding the
anthropological perspective, and to
outline some of the basic tenants upon
which ethnography is based, resulted in a
failure to help the Giksan Wet'suwet'en
case. The longed for 'usefulness' of
anthropology can only become realized if
the discipline is able to de-codify its
principles, to bring its seemingly esoteric
ideology out into the sunlight.
It is difficult enough for a single
individual anthropologist to advocate
support of a cause, but often
anthropologists also find themselves
pitted against one another, in a battle for
some group's rights, and for their own
prestige. Varied interpretation is the
cornerstone of this bullfight, and the
anthropologist that is able to build a
more objective case is likely to win.
This is no small task considering the
subjective material upon which most of
anthropology is based.
Tonkinson points out that "the
principle that we deal with 'partial truths'
is an article of faith in postmodernist
critiques of ethnography" (1997: 14).
Just as culture is subjective, so is its
interpretation. The very heart of
anthropology is its ability to be
ambivalent. It can accommodate dissent
and criticism, and build upon the
principles which challenges it.
So what then of the fate of
objectivity? D' Andrade suggests that
even objective accounts can apply values
to a subject (1995:399). Perhaps supreme
objectivity is impossible outside of
science, since the reader, if not the
anthropologist, may assign value to any
statement which appears value-free.
Evaluating statements which many seem
without value is a construct of human
thought, aimed at placing one's newly
acquired knowledge into a schema, part
of which relies upon knowing if
something is good or bad, detrimental or
beneficial. Thus the interpretation of
even objective events may rely on an
individual understanding of those events.
Especially in a social science of
understanding humanity, individuals are
likely to seek motivation behind action,
and thus assign some kind of value to
seemingly neutral activities.
Since interpretation is a readily
practiced human construct,
anthropologists have no choice but to
accept the validity of all sides of the
argument. They must take into
consideration all histories, and all
genealogies, because the discipline is
built upon the study of people, whose
interaction with the physical, mental, and
mythical environments shapes their
conceptions of their very surroundings.
Anthropology has determined that there
are no archetypal individuals who can
define the norm of interpretation, nor are
there prototypical societies that have
similarities to all other societies.
Thus a moral code for advocacy
must be drawn at an individual level.
The individual must subscribe to certain
tenets of behaviour and this collective
individualism is what will define the
code of ethics for anthropology. A
collection of patterns of behaviour by
anthropologists could form the basic
sphere for acceptable action. Based upon
these exemplars, codification of the
ethics of anthropology could be created.
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Education of the anthropologist In
addition to practical experience, is the
only realistic method for creating such a
unified code of ethics.
The first step to creating a moral
code has already been taken. Some
universities offer fourth year
undergraduate courses where students are
faced with the sticky topic of ethics.
Perhaps for the first time they are able to
grapple with the notions of morality and
justice from their own, and others',
points of view. Education is the key to
forging the ethical path, and perhaps
other courses in anthropological ethics
should be offered to supplement all of
the other courses. Perhaps even the
inclusion of philosophical anthropology
courses could provide students with the
framework to act logically and morally
especially in instances where such
options seem unclear.
To address the question of
applying anthropology to make it a more
useful discipline, again education may be
an initial start particularly in light of the
recent trend of anthropological law, for
which little formal training is currently
available. Some authors, like Sally Falk
Moore (1978) work with anthropology
and the law and would be able to show
students how to frame their questions and
statements in a manner applicable to both
the general public and in acceptable legal
forums. The legal arena is an area which
could benefit from the expertise offered
by anthropologists, if anthropologists are
able to supply information with which
legal representatives can work.
It is also the responsibility of
anthropology at large to inform the
public of its efforts. Many people do not
even know what an anthropologist does,
let alone how anthropological
information can be of value. Perhaps by
using the recent trend of packaging and
marketing disciplines for public
consumption, anthropology could better
align itself within the spotlight.
Anthropologists are witnesses to some of
the most interesting human practices, and
also to the vilest human abuses. Scheper-
Hughes asks "to what end are we given
and do we represent these images as long
as the misery and the suffering continue
unabated?" (D' Andrade and Scheper-
Hughes 1995:416). Here anthropological
intervention can not only bring relief to
suffering people, but it can use those
images to promote the good of which
anthropology is capable, and may
educate the general public at the same
time. While Taussig (1992; as cited in
D' Andrade and Scheper Hughes
1995 :416) warns that desensitization is a
quick mechanism used by many to dull
the reality of harsh environments.
Perhaps it is up to anthropology to bring
such issues into the light of reality and
promote conscious awareness of global
situations.
To carry on the work that
anthropology has completed to date, it
seems essential that a formal document
outlining the responsibilities of
anthropologists should be drafted. While
it may only outline the barest bones of
common sense, if nothing else it would
promote open discussion of acceptable
and unacceptable actions. In addition,
instituting an ethics review committee,
which could be consulted during periods
of uncertainty, would take the pressure
off of individual anthropologists to make
decisions on their own. Knowledge in
this domain should be shared, and a
community of anthropologists should be
available for support.
Without some support group or
formal statement of moral objectives, an
Huculiak: Anthropology and Advocacy
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2000
individual is left with nothing but his or
her own judgment in making important
decisions. While ultimately such
decisions are individual, the ability to
consult other resources seems to be an
appropriate measure. At least under the
umbrella of a comprehensive moral
agreement, can the many-fractured
discipline of anthropology gain a sense
of cohesion. Not only would ethics
documentation add to the credibility of
the discipline, but it would also provide
greater insurance that anthropologists are
able to make well-educated, sound
decisions In emotionally charged
situations.
Bringing morality together with
advocacy has never been an easy task.
Granted that it is difficult to decipher on
whose account and on what basis to
advocate, however, anthropologists
should nevertheless avoid the assumption
that removing advocacy from their field
is a reasonable alternative. As in many
fields of anthropology, a multi-sided
approach to advocacy is perhaps the best
present mode of action. By creating a
support network through an ethics
committee, anthropologists can draw on
the experience of others when grappling
with difficult moral decisions. While
interpretation is subjective, decisions will
ultimately be made on the
anthropologist's best personal judgment.
It is therefore up to universities to stress
methods of moral reasoning in their
courses. The institution of a moral code
of action for anthropology may one day
be possible, and would provide
anthropologists with greater
accountability to the general public than
they currently enjoy. Anthropology's
future, without such a code, will lead to
the same inefficiencies as has been
experienced in the past with regards to
legal advocacy. Anthropology should be
a forum through which the voice of the
subaltern is heard, and, it can meet this
mandate of providing necessary services
to the world. Such goals are only
possible, however, if anthropological
material can be rendered easily
understood by the general public, and by
following moral standards set out by the
discipline.
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